6. The Need for "Victory"
CONFLICT RESOLUTION usually comes only in one of
two forms: a victory in which
"peace" is imposed upon a beaten enemy; and a
mutual victory in which each side feels that honor and
national objectives have been satisfied. The Serbs were overrun in Kosovo, their
most holy territory, by the Turks at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389; they did not, however,
submit to the Turkish overlords, eventually fighting for, and gaining, their independence
again in the early 19th Century in one of the first major wars against feudalism.
So today’s Serbs are unlikely to accept the alienation of their lands; certainly
any forced division of Serbian territory would result in years — even centuries
— of conflict in one form or another. So "victory" for the two contestants
in the current Balkan war is seen as, on the one hand, the perpetuation of national
sovereignty, and on the other hand as a final end to communism in Europe. The NATO states also see "justice" for the Kosovar Albanians as
part of the equation, even though the NATO 1999 military
approach has been largely responsible for the destruction of Kosovo’s economic
and social viability.
Given that a cessation of military activity and embargoes by NATO against Yugoslavia
would restore that country’s sense of sovereignty, and that some kind of symbolism
that Yugoslavia embraces Western market economics could be found, there is very little
distance to travel from the present impasse to a sense of victory on both sides. It is true, however, that Western leaders (particularly Clinton and
Blair) have indicated that only the departure from office of President Miloševic
would mark the transformation from the ancien regime to the "new world
order".
The problem with that requirement for NATO’s "victory" is that the
Yugoslav people, previously in varying degrees hostile to their President, have now
(because of NATO) rallied around him, and would reject the imposition of a NATO edict
demanding the President’s removal from office.
On April 22, 1999, a Russian Government delegation led by former Prime Minister Viktor
S. Chernomyrdin held meetings with the Yugoslav President. The New York Times the
next day reported that the Yugoslav Government "appeared to give very little
ground", but in fact he agreed to "an international presence [in Kosovo] under
United Nations auspices", a significant point, if the US was not fundamentally
suspicious of the UN. Underlying the entire conflict resolution
process is the fact that the US Clinton Administration does not really have any idea what
should constitute victory. On the one hand, it has said that victory means resettlement of the Kosovo Albanians under
an autonomous, if not independent, state. On the other, it has said that victory could not be achieved if Yugoslav President
Miloševic remained in office.
Basically, however, Clinton has consistently moved the goalposts, so that any response
given by the Miloševic Government would be unacceptable.
