We continue to see strong indications that we are in the terminal phase of the war. The decision of Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to accompany Viktor Chernomyrdin to Belgrade is a strong indicator that the United States and Russia have now reach detailed agreement on the terms needed to end the war. Ahtisaari had said that he would not travel to Belgrade unless Chernomyrdin and Strobe Talbott made substantial progress and, by implication, had a common position. Ahtisaari, the EU representative on Kosovo, with close ties to the United Nations, was not prepared to commit his offices to negotiations until after a unified position was crafted between the U.S. and Russia. His reasoning was sound. If the U.S. and Russia weren’t working from a common script, nothing he achieved in Belgrade would hold together. Moreover, Milosevic would try to use any gap between the U.S. and Russian position to extract further concessions. Given that, no progress was possible until the U.S. and Russia had a common position.

That common position, clearly based on the G-8 agreements already achieved, is now in place. The presence of Ahtisaari in Belgrade means clearly that whatever troops enter Kosovo will be under UN and not NATO command. The presence of Chernomyrdin further guarantees that the political oversight of those troops will not be solely in the hands of NATO and the United States. Finally, Ahtisaari’s involvement signals the commitment by the continental EU countries to end the war. In short, Ahtisaari is going to Belgrade to give Milosevic guarantees on behalf of the UN and EU while Chernomyrdin is going to give him guarantees on behalf of Russia.

Milosevic would not have been able to resist NATO with the tenacity he has had he not had Russian support. The threat of the loss of Russian backing changes the strategic and geopolitical foundations of his decisions. Therefore, with the premise on which his decision was based dissolving, the decision itself has to be altered. Belgrade is already indicating that it is prepared to live with the deal. Milosevic will undoubtedly want to scrutinize the details and attempt to extract whatever technical points possible that would increase the probability of retained sovereignty over Kosovo.

He will also have one additional demand: disarming the KLA. That will be easier to agree to than to enforce. This actually will help Milosevic in the long run. By agreeing to withdraw most Serbian forces from Kosovo, Milosevic shifts the responsibility for controlling the KLA to the United Nations and to Russia. KLA actions will create an opportunity to drive a wedge between Russia and NATO as Russia blames NATO for its actions. Indeed, it will drive a wedge between NATO members Germany and Italy on one side and the U.S. and UK on the other. Germany and Italy will want the KLA controlled and will hold the U.S. and UK responsible for its actions. Since the KLA has become uncontrollable and will have a vested interest in maintaining tension, this will give Milosevic leverage in the post-war environment.

Thus, the next few days will be filled with discussions of how to control the KLA and how to return the Albanians to their homes. Milosevic will use the former as a means to make himself the aggrieved party. Delays in the latter he will blame, with full legitimacy, on the damage caused by NATO bombing of Kosovo’s infrastructure. Milosevic will concede many points, but he will be in a fairly good position to control the post-war evolution of events. Indeed, having filed charges against NATO for war crimes already, he will even be able to counter demands that he face war crimes tribunals with full agreement, provided Bill Clinton and Tony Blair also go on trial. Milosevic’s position: let the courts judge us all.